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Arm‘s-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship 
Marion Crain  
Two important assumptions shape the law of work: that workers 
and employers possess interests that are diametrically opposed, and 
that each makes no investment in the other beyond the immediate 
exchange of dollars for labor. Neither assumption is justified. 
Without work to be done, jobs won‘t exist; accordingly, workers are 
keenly interested in supporting the firms for which they labor.
1
 
Workers pour sweat, blood, and even dollars into the firms that 
employ them when firms need it most.
2




Wiley B. Rutledge Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Interdisciplinary 
Study of Work & Social Capital, Washington University in St. Louis. I am grateful to Dean 
Kent Syverud, Washington University School of Law, and the Israel Treiman fellowship for 
funding, and thank Deirdre Aaron, Nick Billman, and Andrew Donelan for excellent research 
assistance. Participants in the ―For Love or Money?‖ workshop sponsored by Washington 
University‘s Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Work & Social Capital in March 2010 
offered valuable insights. I am particularly indebted to Scott Baker and Noah Zatz for 
discussions and comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. Even the most militant labor unions have internalized this message, agreeing to wage 
concessions during recessionary periods to help struggling firms. See, e.g., United Automobile 
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
organizations/u/united_automobile_workers/index.html (reporting that the United Auto 
Workers‘ Union made wage and benefit concessions worth $7,000 to $30,000 a year per 
member during the 2008–09 recession in an effort to save jobs and assist GM and Chrysler). 
Union organizers, too, have incorporated the understanding that workers and firms‘ fortunes 
and well-being are linked. Consider, for example, the Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical 
Workers‘ campaign slogan: ―It‘s not anti-Harvard to be pro-union.‖ See Marion Crain, 
Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1819, 1874 (1992) (describing non-
adversarial approach to organizing adopted by the Harvard union). 
 2. See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 1179, 1186, 1233–37 (2010) (describing propensity of workers to invest their retirement 
savings in company stock and firms‘ marketing efforts to encourage identification with the 
corporate brand that might encourage such behavior). Despite increased public awareness about 
the risks of insufficient diversification of employee retirement portfolios in the wake of the 
Enron and WorldCom debacles, many workers continue to invest the bulk of their retirement 
portfolios in company stock. In January 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that workers 
were responding to the recession by investing more, not less, in the companies that employed 
them. See Eleanor Laise, Despite Risks, Workers Guzzle Company Stock, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 
2009, at D1.  











164 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 35:163 
 
 
interested only in wringing every last drop of sweat out of each 
worker for the minimum price possible. In the modern hyper-
competitive market, firms utilize myriad recruiting and retention 
strategies to bind workers to the firm, hoping to convince workers to 
link their identities as well as their financial fortunes to the firm.
3
 To 
foster employee morale, firms promulgate handbooks and policy 




Employment is rife with evidence of mutual investment. Workers 
make firm-specific human capital investments, learning how 
institutions that employ them function and forging relationships with 
coworkers, customers, and competitors that are not readily 
transportable to the next job. Workers construct their personal lives—
their homes, families, social networks, and communities—around the 
assumption that their work in that place and often for that employer 
will continue absent business downturns or poor performance. 
Employers also make investments: training, relocation, and costly 
benefit packages are designed to attract talent, nurture firm loyalty, 
and encourage organizational citizenship behavior.
5
  
Work law ignores the realities of interdependence and mutual 
investment, committing itself to a model of employment as an arm‘s-
length, impersonal cash-for-labor transaction.
6
 Employment at will is 
 
 3. See Crain, supra note 2, at 1200–20, 1227–29. 
 4. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1259 n.2, 1265 (N.J. 
1985) (analyzing employee handbook that promised to ―retain to the extent consistent with 
company requirements, the services of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and 
effectively,‖ and finding the promise enforceable; the court noted that the employer secured 
valuable advantages by articulating this company philosophy in its handbook, including 
enhanced morale and union avoidance); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 
1087–89 (Wash. 1984) (finding employer contractually bound to promises of job security and 
fair treatment in an employee handbook where promises secured ―an orderly, cooperative and 
loyal work force‖). 
 5. In the new economy, service firms in particular depend heavily upon ―organizational 
citizenship behavior‖ by employees—that is, extraordinary effort and firm loyalty that is not 
rewarded through traditional reward mechanisms (wages). See DENNIS W. ORGAN, 
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE GOOD SOLDIER SYNDROME 4–5 (1988); 
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 95 (2004). See generally Crain, supra note 2, at 1196 (describing 
firms‘ increasing reliance on extra-role behavior of front-line employees). 
 6. On the prevalence of the law‘s conceptualization of employment as ―an abstract 

















 In its strictest legal incarnation, ―[t]he at-will 
contract lasts only from moment to moment, at every moment 
completed and at every moment renewed.‖
8
 Thus, employees are free 
to quit, and the employer is free to discharge, without notice, 
severance pay, or proof of fault, unless the parties contract explicitly 
to the contrary.  
A contractual framework characterized by the assumption of 
arm‘s-length dealing and a default rule of unrestricted unilateral exit 
with no notice or transitional period overlooks the substantial 
emotional attachment and investment that define work for many 
workers. Discharge, when it comes, is often sudden and devastating, 
dealing a powerful emotional blow that severs workers‘ 
psychological moorings.
9
 Discharged workers suffer tremendous 
stress and accompanying health effects, including increased risk of 
disease, alcoholism, social impacts such as increased propensity for 
spousal and child abuse, divorce, and higher death rates.
10
 Sudden job 
 
relationships,‖ see Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and 
Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 
864 (1989) (explaining how contractual imagery of self-interested individuals dealing with one 
another at arm‘s length has a ―durable hold on modern liberal thought‖). 
 7. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (―All [employers] may 
dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for 
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.‖). The rationale behind this 
doctrine is the policy favoring business flexibility—to maximize the ability of firms to shrink 
and enlarge their workforces in response to market fluctuations—and by the concomitant 
freedom of employees to quit to pursue more desirable market alternatives. Despite a series of 
common law incursions in many states, the basic doctrine remains the default rule in all 
jurisdictions save one. See MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 100–22 (2d ed. 2010). For a recent invocation of the right to 
discharge at will, see Kim Janssen, Packer Backer Fired for Wearing Green Bay Tie, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/3473075-418/store-tie-customers-bears-
john.html (describing discharge of car salesman who came to work on the day after the Green 
Bay Packers defeated the Chicago Bears wearing a branded Packers necktie). 
 8. Katherine V.W. Stone, Dismissal Law in the United States: The Past and Present of 
At-Will Employment 1 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-
03, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342667.  
 9. See LOUIS UCHITELLE, THE DISPOSABLE AMERICAN: LAYOFFS AND THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES 178–204 (2006).  
 10.  Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads 
Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988); see also Andrew E. Clark et al., Scarring: 
The Psychological Impact of Past Unemployment, 68 ECONOMICA 221 (2001) (demonstrating 
long-term psychological scarring effect of experience of being discharged or laid off); Richard 
E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8 
(2004) (explaining that discharged workers never fully return to previous levels of life 
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loss is correlated with lower post-displacement earnings, which in 
turn leads to downward economic mobility and spiraling economic 
effects that impact whole communities.
11
  
Moreover, the vast majority of individual workers lack the 
bargaining leverage or knowledge of their rights necessary to protect 
their investment by negotiating for job security.
12
 Absent a labor 
 
satisfaction); Michael Luo, For Workers at Closing Plant, Ordeal Included Heart Attacks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at A22 (discussing health consequences of layoffs, including doubled 
risk of heart attack and stroke in older workers). Job loss significantly impacts life expectancy, 
as well: one study found that death rates jumped 50 to 100 percent in the year after a job loss, 
and were still 10 to 15 percent higher twenty years later. Luo, supra (discussing study by Till 
von Wachter and Daniel G. Sullivan). Loss of material resources such as income and health 
insurance, as well as the prolonged earning reduction that typically follows lengthy 
unemployment, can also affect health by serving as additional stressors. See Unemployment 
Can Have Long-Term Effects on Physical and Mental Health, Speakers Say, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 214, Nov. 5, 2010, at A-7. 
 11.  One study found that for higher-earning, longer-tenured workers the income losses 
amounted to nearly three times the workers‘ annual salaries. LOUIS S. JACOBSON, ROBERT J. 
LALONDE & DANIEL G. SULLIVAN, THE COSTS OF WORKER DISLOCATION 85–87 (1993). Job 
loss results in lifetime earnings losses because post-displacement earnings are typically 
reduced, particularly where discharge is sudden and transition time is inadequate to secure a 
new job. See Richard W. McHugh, Fair Warning or Foul? An Analysis of the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act in Practice, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 1, 63–64 (1993) (summarizing studies demonstrating that advance notice of plant closing is 
associated with lower unemployment and poverty rates three years later); Gary Chartier, 
Friendship, Identity, and Solidarity. An Approach to Rights in Plant Closing Cases, 16 RATIO 
JURIS 324, 343–45 (2003) (explaining how large plants create and sustain social networks 
critical to the communities in which they are located, and likening plant closing to the psychic 
death of the community); STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS: 
YOUNGSTOWN‘S STEEL MILL CLOSINGS 77 (1982) (explaining that workplace networks 
functioned as a ―second family‖ in long-time mill towns). 
 12. In his Comment to this Essay, Scott Baker challenges my assumption that most 
individual workers lack bargaining power. See Scott Baker, Comment on Arm‘s-Length 
Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 213 (2011). The assumption 
is not mine alone, however. Legislators and courts alike have taken testimony, made findings, 
and relied upon the disparity in bargaining power between individual workers and employers as 
the justification for regulating the employment relation. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (finding that ―[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees 
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who 
are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and 
affects the flow of commerce . . . by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage 
earners in industry‖ and conferring the right to organize and bargain collectively in order to 
―restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and employees‖); W. Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding constitutional validity of Washington State 
minimum wage, and stating: ―The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal 
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the denial 
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union, no real negotiation occurs over most terms and conditions of 
employment. Imagine the typical job applicant in the 2011 labor 
market negotiating for job security, for example. By contrast, firms 
are able to protect their investments through covenants not to 
compete and confidentiality agreements, to which workers routinely 
agree (often severely compromising their future employability). Yet 
work law continues to treat employment as if it were an impersonal 
cash-for-labor transaction between equals, hewing to assumptions of 
independence and arm‘s-length bargaining even where their 
application seems fanciful.  
Other legal models exist that would be more responsive to the 
realities of the employment relationship, particularly at termination. 
Marriage law offers a status-based framework designed to recognize 
and protect investment in relationships characterized by intimacy, 
interdependence, and investment. Notice and waiting periods are 
standard fare at marital dissolution to ease the transition and 
encourage couples to salvage marital relationships, temporary support 
and alimony are available to dependent spouses, and fault is still 
relevant in many states. Might such a status-based framework be 
adapted for the employment relationship? The employment 
relationship, after all, possesses many attributes that we associate 
with marriage and long-term intimate relationships: psychological 
and economic investment, interdependence, and expectations that the 
relationship will endure absent bad behavior. Employment 
relationships are also surprisingly intimate; relationships at work 




for their support upon the community.‖); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898) 
(upholding statute limiting employment in underground mines and smelters to eight hours per 
day, and stating: ―The legislature has also recognized the fact . . . that the proprietors of these 
establishments and their operatives do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to 
a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible 
from their employees, while the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to conform to 
regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental to their 
health or strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are 
practically constrained to obey them.‖). 
 13. See Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimacy in Economic Organizations, in ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 23, 33–34 (Nina Bandelj ed., 2009) (describing forms that workplace 
intimacy assumes); see also Gail M. McGuire, Intimate Work: A Typology of the Social Support 
That Workers Provide to Their Network Members, 34 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 125, 134 (2007) 
(identifying and describing the array of support that coworkers offer one another, both inside 
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At first blush, the idea of applying legal principles developed for 
application to marriage and family may seem preposterous. Marriage 
is, after all, about love; work is about money. But think again: many 
people display contempt for their spouses and demonstrate passion 
for their work. For some, the ―emotional magnets‖ between affective 
families and work have actually reversed: sociologist Arlie 
Hochschild concluded that these workers view their workplaces as 
home, choosing to invest emotionally in their work ―families‖ rather 
than in their traditional affective families.
14
 Moreover, the always 
blurry line between work and love or leisure—between activities 
undertaken for profit and those pursued out of passion—has become 
increasingly difficult to draw in the lives of modern Blackberry-
carrying, cell phone-toting workers.
15
 One recent study found that at 
least some categories of workers are so invested in work that they 
have precious little time left for family.
16
 
Our resistance to the notion of a law of relationship termination 
that would apply equally to the worlds of love and work stems from 
law‘s obsession with maintaining separate spheres of economic 
activity (the world of impersonal rationality) and intimacy (the world 
of sentiment). In a powerful book, sociologist Viviana Zelizer 
described and critiqued this divide, observing that in real life 
activities undertaken for love and for profit are often commingled, 
complementary, and even interdependent.
17
 Drawing on Zelizer‘s 
insights, this Essay returns to first principles, challenging the 
assumptions that justify the differential treatment of waged work and 
intimate relationships at law, particularly at termination. Why does 
law assume, during pendency of the relationship, that the interests of 
 
and outside the workplace); Chartier, supra note 11, at 343–44 (exploring how workplace 
networks shape the identities of workers and communities). 
 14. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME 
AND HOME BECOMES WORK 44, 198–201 (1997) (describing workers‘ preference for investing 
time and energy in the arena of paid employment rather than with their families). 
 15. See generally CHRISTENA E. NIPPERT-ENG, HOME AND WORK: NEGOTIATING 
BOUNDARIES THROUGH EVERYDAY LIFE (1996) (discussing workers‘ choices and strategies 
regarding segmentation or integration of work and home). 
 16. Sixty-two percent of high-earning workers surveyed worked more than fifty hours per 
week, 35 percent worked more than sixty hours per week, and 10 percent worked more than 
eighty hours per week. See Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce, Extreme Jobs: The 
Dangerous Allure of the 70-Hour Workweek, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 49, 50–51. 
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workers and employers are always opposed, while those of 
cohabiting lovers and spouses are always aligned? Why does law 
neglect transition costs at exit from employment, but attend to them 
at exit from marriage? Why does law disregard investment and 
reliance in the employment context, yet recognize and compensate 
for investment and reliance in marriage or marriage-like 
relationships? Why does law resist acknowledging intimate or 
affective connections at work, yet embrace them in marriage, family 
and marriage-like relationships? I suggest the difference it might 
make to cast aside traditional separate-spheres thinking about labor 
and love, and argue for a status-based framework in which 
employment is reconceptualized as a relationship characterized by 
dependence and investment that is more akin to marriage than to an 
impersonal, cash-for-labor transaction.
18
 I look to divorce and marital 
property law as a blueprint for a law of relationship termination 
transferrable to the employment context.  
I. SEPARATE SPHERES: LOVE AND WAGED WORK 
Love and work form the core of a meaningful existence. When 
they endure, they serve as sources of both emotional and financial 
support, minimize dependence upon the state for subsistence, 
constitute our identities, and structure our lives. When they collapse, 
the effects on individuals are often devastating, both financially and 
emotionally.  
The law, however, draws a clear distinction between employment 
(waged labor) and intimate (for love) relationships. Waged labor 
 
 18. In this effort, I am deeply indebted to Kate Silbaugh for her provocative and 
groundbreaking Article questioning the law‘s treatment of these categories in the context of 
housework and domestic labor. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework 
and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).  
 I recognize that my thesis runs contrary to that of many feminists who focus on the 
institution of marriage and the governing family law, who have made persuasive arguments in 
favor of a shift toward a contractarian approach in that context. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing against the status of marriage and in favor of contract); Mary Anne 
Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 225 (2011). 
While persuasive in the context of individuals possessing equal bargaining status, a 
contractarian approach is poorly suited to employment because of the gross disparity in 
bargaining power between most workers and the firms that employ them. 
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arrangements are theorized in law as transactional, adversarial, 
economically rational (for profit), fundamentally self-interested, and 
predicated on an expectation of reciprocal benefit. Intimate 
relationships, on the other hand, are characterized as future-looking, 
sharing a common purpose, motivated by other-regarding feelings of 
love and affection, and featuring compromise, cooperation, and 
sometimes sacrifice.  
Yet the lived experience of most people belies this artificial 
divide. For the luckiest among us, work is a calling, a labor of love.
19
 
In a fascinating study, Stuart Bunderson and Jeffery Thompson found 
that zookeepers understood their work as encompassing a moral 
obligation of vigilance for the proper treatment of the animals in their 
care.
20
 The zookeepers willingly made economic sacrifices to 
perform work that was dirty, dangerous, slopped over into personal 
time and crowded out family life, and offered little opportunity for 
professional advancement or personal growth.
21
 For them, work was 
about much more than money. As one of their interview subjects 
explained: ―I‘m making $9 an hour and every day I drive past 
Subway and on their little leader board out front: ‗Hiring starting at 
$9 an hour.‘ I make as much as someone at McDonald‘s does. I‘m 
certainly not doing it for the money.‖
22
 
Others asserted that they would do the job for nothing, pointing to 
years of volunteer work prior to obtaining the job.
23
 Some worried 
that their ideological and personal commitment to the work made 
them vulnerable to exploitation, noting that they tried to hide their 
commitment to minimize this vulnerability.
24
 Ultimately, however, 
 
 19. See J. Stuart Bunderson & Jeffery A. Thompson, The Call of the Wild: Zookeepers, 
Callings, and the Double-Edged Sword of Deeply Meaningful Work, 54 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 32, 32–
34 (2009) (describing what it means to see work as a calling); see also MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 105 (1996) (distinguishing between rank and file and 
professional workers in this way: ―Laborers play notes, . . . and [professionals] play the 
music.‖). But see Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 543, 544–45 (2004) (arguing that de-skilling strategies have resulted in the 
commodification of professionals‘ labor). 
 20. Bunderson & Thompson, supra note 19, at 41–42. 
 21. Id. at 42–43. One participant confessed that his love for zookeeping work had cost 
him his marriage. Id. at 42. 
 22. Id. at 42. 
 23. Id.  
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most accepted the risk of exploitation as part of the personal sacrifice 
made to pursue work as a calling.
25
 
The emotional significance of work to one‘s life is not limited, 
however, to those who heed a calling. Sometimes its meaning lies in 
the nature of the tangible things we create through our work and the 
mark we leave upon the world. A stonemason in Studs Terkel‘s 
memorable book, Working, described how his work brought purpose 
and continuity to his life: 
 There‘s not a house in this country that I haven‘t built that I 
don‘t look at every time I go by. . . . I can set here now and 
actually in my mind see so many that you wouldn‘t 
believe. . . . I‘ve got one house in mind right now. . . . That‘s 
the work of my hands. . . . 
 I can‘t imagine a job where you go home and maybe go by 
a year later and you don‘t know what you‘ve done. My work, I 
can see what I did the first day I started. All my work is set 
right out there in the open and I can look at it as I go by. It‘s 
something I can see the rest of my life. . . . 
 [Work means i]mmortality as far as [I‘m] concerned.
26
  
Just as commonly, the significance of work is found in the social 
connections fostered there. Consider Tammy Calef‘s description of 
the bonds she shared with her coworkers, which she felt keenly upon 
discharge:  
Imagine being in a family for almost ten years and then they 
tell you they don‘t want you anymore. I loved my job. I loved 
working for FedEx. I had made a determination that this is 
[where] I was going to retire. . . . I saw FedEx employees more 
than I saw my family and I did everything that they wanted me 
to do and [then] I‘m injured. I‘m still doing my job [but] 
they‘re telling me go home. Go home until you hear back from 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. STUDS TERKEL, WORKING: PEOPLE TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY DO ALL DAY AND 
HOW THEY FEEL ABOUT WHAT THEY DO 21–22 (1974) (quoting Carl Murray Bates, 
stonemason). 
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There can be little doubt that the workplace is a central site for the 
personal relationships that sustain us. Researchers have marveled at 
the range of intimate relationships that arise in the workplace and the 
role that such relationships play in enhancing workplace productivity 
and worker well-being within and beyond the workplace.
28
 Important 
workplace relationships are forged at both the individual level (23 
percent of employees in one survey reported ―a platonic office 
‗husband‘ or ‗wife,‘ with whom they ‗hang out‘ regularly‖)
29
 and at 
the collective level (both Viviana Zelizer and legal scholar Vicki 




Work law has acknowledged the non-market components of 
relationships between coworkers in at least two contexts, though its 
embrace of the non-market aspects of the relationships has been 
tepid, at best. First, labor law recognizes the ethic of union solidarity 
through section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which protects 
concerted activity ―for mutual aid or protection.‖
31
 To receive 
protection, however, workers must show that their activity was self-
interested and addressed to a subject of legitimate concern to workers 
qua workers—typically wages, hours, or working conditions.
32
 
Second, employment discrimination doctrine protects workers against 
employer retaliation for assertions of rights under the anti-
discrimination statutes, and the Supreme Court has recently 
 
 27. Calef v. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., 343 F. App‘x 891, 895–96 (4th Cir. 
2009) (alteration in original). 
 28. See Zelizer, supra note 13, at 33–34; see also McGuire, supra note 13, at 134 
(describing the forms that such bonds assume in the workplace). 
 29. Zelizer, supra note 13, at 35; see also Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives (Jan. 17, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 30. See Zelizer, supra note 13, at 29–30; Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 
YALE L.J. 2061, 2069, 2191 (2003).  
 31. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).  
 32. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (holding that employee activity is 
protected only if self-interested); NLRB v. Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., Inc., 130 F.2d 
503, 505–06 (2d Cir. 1942) (reasoning that individuals who aid coworkers act for the purpose 
of mutual aid or protection because they perceive an implied promise of reciprocal benefit to 
themselves); see also Fischl, supra note 6 (critiquing narrow interpretation of mutualism in 
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confirmed that this protection includes retaliation targeting a 
worker‘s intimates at work—though not ―mere acquaintances.‖
33
 
Thus, although the workplace serves as an important source of 
connection and belonging on par with that offered by family,
34
 law 
tends to reduce the employment relationship to a self-interested 
economic exchange and ignores the non-familial forms that intimacy 
assumes in that venue. 
At the same time, however, intimate relationships—such as those 
within marriage—are not subject to the laws regulating the market. 
Yet marriage and marriage-like relationships are at least by some 
accounts still as fundamentally economic at their core as they were 
historically. Despite our modern commitment in the United States to 
a vision of marriage as a lifelong romance with one‘s soulmate, 
evidence from social scientists suggests that marriage is neither 
lifelong nor romantic for many people.
35
 The modern ideal of 
romantic-companionate marriage, some suggest, is inherently 
unstable.
36
 As the crude divorce rate approached 50 percent, the 
phenomenon of the ―starter marriage‖ prompted books and even a 
television miniseries.
37
 Through serial marriage and divorce, the story 
goes, individuals mature and learn which qualities are most important 
to them in a spouse and simultaneously advance their economic and 
social status with each marriage—just as they would with successive 
 
 33. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869 (2011) (declining to 
identify a ―fixed class of relationships for which third-party reprisals are unlawful,‖ but noting 
that discharge of a ―close family member‖ would always be actionable, while milder reprisals 
against ―a mere acquaintance‖ would rarely be actionable); see also Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the 
Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63 (2002) 
(arguing that Title VII should protect workers who advance Title VII-protected norms of 
workplace equality in order to protect intergroup worker solidarity across gender or racial 
lines).  
 34. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 5–7 (2003). 
 35. See Andrew J. Cherlin, American Marriage in the Early Twenty-First Century, 15 
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: MARRIAGE AND CHILD WELL-BEING 33, 43–46 (2005). 
 36. Marion Crain, “Where Have All The Cowboys Gone?” Marriage and Breadwinning 
in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1886 (1999). 
 37. See PAMELA PAUL, THE STARTER MARRIAGE AND THE FUTURE OF MATRIMONY 
(2002) (analyzing historical trends in American marital patterns and finding that Americans are 
increasingly marrying multiple times over the course of longer life spans, and implying that 
divorce is part of an experimentation and maturation process); GIGI LEVANGIE GRAZER, THE 
STARTER WIFE (2005) (upon which a 2008–09 USA Network miniseries was based). 
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home purchases. Further, intimate partnerships short of marriage are 
increasingly sustained as much by the practical financial savings 
realized through cohabitation as by an emotional commitment to the 
relationship.
38
 Yet law persists in treating intimate and familial 
relationships differently than it does market relationships. 
II. MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE CATEGORIES: LOVER OR LABORER 
To maintain the separate spheres of love and work, law must 
discipline relationships that challenge the boundaries between love 
and labor. For most courts, the quintessential employment 
relationship is conducted at arm‘s length, is devoid of affective or 
familial ties and is defined by easy exit. This section discusses two 
cases that illustrate the dichotomy between love and labor in law. 
Both cases involve claims by individuals asserting employee status 
for purposes of recovering wages for labor performed. In both cases, 
the plaintiffs‘ intimate, affective bonds to their asserted employers 
resulted in their categorization as not ―employees,‖ and their claims 
failed.  
In Velez v. Sanchez,
39
 an Ecuadoran teenager named Linda Velez 
argued that she was brought to the United States and forced to work 
as a caregiver in the home of a New York family.
40
 Velez testified 
that her responsibilities included living with Betsy Sanchez and her 
family, and caring for Sanchez‘s young children.
41
 In return, Sanchez 
promised that Velez could complete high school in the United States 
and that she would pay Velez $80.00 per week for her services and 
provide lodging, food, and other necessaries. Sanchez did not, in fact, 
send Velez to high school; instead, she paid for Velez to take an 
English class, a GED course, and a class at a community college.
42
 




 38. Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 
42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 323 (2008) (describing evidence that cohabitants in the United States 
typically cohabit for practical reasons—shared finances, housing, and convenience—rather than 
out of a relational commitment). 
 39. No. 04-CV-4797, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126586 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010).  
 40. Id. at *1. 
 41. Id. at *4.  
 42. Id. at *7.  
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relationship between the two soon soured, and interactions in the 
Sanchez household became increasingly hostile. Velez testified that 
Sanchez and her sister verbally abused her and subsequently sought 
to physically prevent her from leaving.
44
 
Velez brought a wage and hour claim under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) and a forced labor claim under the Alien Tort 
Statute.
45
 The district court rejected both claims and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Sanchez family, concluding that 
Velez ―was a member of the Sanchez household—albeit an unhappy 
one—not an employee.‖
46
 The court relied on several factors: the 
existence of familial ties (Betsy Sanchez‘s father was Linda Velez‘s 
stepfather, although the two had never lived in the same household 
previously and the court acknowledged that no legally cognizable 
family tie existed);
47
 Velez‘s testimony that she regarded Sanchez as 
a sister, and gave her cards and letters commemorating holidays;
48
 the 
fact that Sanchez reciprocated by taking Velez on family vacations, 
giving her gifts, and paying for her classes and YMCA membership, 
which the court observed ―are not the sorts of dispensation one 
receives from an employer;‖
49
 and Velez‘s decision to remain in the 
household after Sanchez told her that she was unable to continue 
paying wages, partly out of ―love‖ for the Sanchez children, and 
partly because she wished to remain in the United States.
50
 Said the 
court: ―When her relationship with [Sanchez] became strained, Velez 
did not react as an employee would—by quitting—but chose to 
remain . . . .‖ Thus, ―no reasonable jury could conclude that the 




Even more revealing was the Fourth Circuit‘s analysis in Steelman 
v. Hirsch.
52
 Tammy Steelman and Michelle Hirsch were lovers who 
 
 44. Id. at *11.  
 45. Id. at *1, *14, *25. 
 46. Id. at *26.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at *8, *27. 
 49. Id. at *27.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. 473 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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exchanged vows in anticipation of spending their lives together, 
considered themselves married, and cohabited in North Carolina from 
1999 to 2004.
53
 At the outset of the romantic relationship, Steelman 
left her job at a residential cleaning company and came to work with 
Hirsch in ―Hair of the Dog,‖ a dog grooming business that Hirsch had 
opened just six months earlier.
54
 The two worked side-by-side in the 
business over the ensuing five years, supporting themselves from its 
proceeds.
55
 Although they had no specific compensation agreement, 
Steelman testified that they had agreed that ―[w]hat was mine was 
hers and what was hers was mine,‖
56
 and described their economic 
interests as aligned and forward-looking: ―My working for her was us 
working for our future.‖
57
 Nevertheless, Hirsch listed Steelman as an 
employee on the books of the business so that Steelman could be 
covered by health insurance through her employment, and issued 
sporadic paychecks to Steelman in order to substantiate the 
employment relationship.
58
 Hirsch testified that although she 
considered bringing Steelman in as a partner in the business, she 
ultimately decided to treat her as an employee and to maintain the 
business as a sole proprietorship.
59
  
Alas, when the romantic relationship broke down, so ended 
Steelman‘s employment.
60
 When Hirsch asked Steelman to return her 
American Express card (used for personal expenses and paid for out 
of Hair of the Dog proceeds), Steelman quit and moved out of the 
house that the couple had shared.
61
 When Hirsch became 
romantically involved with someone else, Steelman opened a 
competing dog grooming business and filed an action in federal 
district court seeking wages owed her under the FLSA and the North 
Carolina Wage and Hour Act.
62
 In the alternative, she asserted an 
ownership stake in Hair of the Dog and sought compensation for the 
 
 53. Id. at 125–27.  
 54. Id. at 125. 
 55. Id. at 126.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 125. 
 58. Id. at 126. 
 59. Id. at 126–27.  
 60. Id. at 127.  
 61. Id.  
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work she had performed in the business during the relationship under 
North Carolina state law, which allows claims for breach of implied 
contract, fraud, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment between 
nonmarital cohabitants if they can establish that they performed 
valuable labor independent of meretricious sexual services.
63
  
Accepting the legal dichotomy between activities undertaken for 
love and those undertaken for profit, Steelman argued that she was 
due compensation either as an employee or as an unmarried 
cohabitant in a marriage-like partnership relationship.
64
 The district 
court granted Hirsch‘s motion for summary judgment and denied 
Steelman‘s claim, reasoning that because employee status is 
fundamentally incompatible with partnership status, Steelman could 
not be both an employee and an equity partner.
65
 Steelman‘s 
employment law claims were rejected, and she was left to pursue her 
Marvin v. Marvin style claims in state court.
66
  
The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
67
 Although the court observed that 
Steelman‘s argument in the alternative (that she was either an 
employee or an intimate romantic partner) was an acceptable 
litigation strategy, the court seemed aghast at the prospect of the law 
acknowledging the coexistence of intimacy and a cash-for-labor 
exchange in the same household and the same business.
68
 The court 
ruled that Hirsch and Steelman‘s intimate relationship negated any 
employment relationship regardless of Steelman‘s status as an 
owner/romantic partner under state law.
69
 Citing cases dealing with 
volunteers, independent contractors, and prison inmates who sought 
recovery of wages due for work performed, the Fourth Circuit found 
that the FLSA permits compensation only for work performed within 
the ―traditional employment paradigm‖ of an ―‗arms‘ length‘ 
 
 63. See Suggs v. Norris, 364 S.E.2d 159, 161–62 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (adopting and 
following the reasoning of Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976)). 
 64. Steelman, 473 F.3d at 128–29.  
 65. Id. at 127.  
 66. Having granted summary judgment to Hirsch on the FLSA claim, the district court 
then dismissed the state law Marvin-styled claims without prejudice, declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 125, 127. 
 67. Id. at 132.  
 68. Id. at 129–30.  
 69. Id. at 128. 
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bargain‖ typical of a ―true employer-employee relationship.‖
70
 
Steelman and Hirsch‘s arrangement, said the court, was not such a 
relationship; it was characterized by shared mutual interests and an 
intention to remain together permanently:  
Taking the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to 
[Steelman], the plaintiff cannot be adjudged an ―employee‖ for 
purposes of the FLSA . . . . The intended lifetime partnership 
she described was not ―the bargained-for exchange of labor for 
mutual economic gain that occurs in a true employer-employee 
relationship.‖ . . . According to the plaintiff, the couple saw 
their work together as a way to improve an economic future 
that they intended to share in perpetuity, rather than as a 




Nor did Steelman behave like an employee. She enjoyed 
―extensive access to company funds,‖ a ―privilege‖ not typical of an 
employee, said the court, but one more likely to be granted to an 
owner/partner.
72
 Moreover, she lived ―comfortably and exclusively 
off the proceeds of the business,‖ and the parties ―shared the risks 
and rewards of their joint venture in a fashion more characteristic of a 
partnership than an employer-employee relationship.‖
73
 Although the 
court stopped short of concluding that one partner in a romantic 
couple could never be an employee of another,
74
 it intoned that the 
FLSA was ―not meant to . . . impos[e] a one-size-fits-all federal 
solution upon all sorts of human relationships,‖ nor was it designed to 
serve as ―a weapon‖ for disappointed intimates ―upon the dissolution 
of all domestic partnerships and other intimate arrangements 
involving shared funds and shared labor.‖
75
 The court worried that 
applying the FLSA to Hirsch and Steelman would ―restructure all 
 
 70. Id. at 129 (quoting Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 71. Id. at 130 (citation omitted). The concurring judge underscored the fact that Steelman 
worked for the couple‘s ―shared advantage‖—―for their future‖—and thus was not operating at 
arm‘s length in a bargained-for exchange of compensation for labor. Id. at 133. 
 72. Id. at 130. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 132 & n.2. 
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manner of personal and financial dealings,‖ and rejected ―plaintiff‘s 
invitation to push the Act to this new frontier.‖
76
  
The courts‘ unwillingness in Velez v. Sanchez and Steelman v. 
Hirsch to recognize the market aspects of familial and intimate 
relationships reflects concerns about commodifying such 
relationships through application of wage and hour laws. Both courts 
sought to define the boundaries of employment relationships by 
limiting them to parties who stand at ―arm‘s length‖ from one another 
and can easily exit without suffering psychological or emotional 
consequences.
77
 Thus, Velez was either a sister or a domestic, and 
Steelman was either a lover or laborer; they could not be both. But 
why should Velez‘s right to wages for her caregiving work or 
Steelman‘s entitlement to just compensation for her investment turn 
on whether either was emotionally attached to their asserted 
employers? Suppose instead that once a claimant established a 
relationship characterized by investment, dependence, and some 
longevity signaling attachment, a general law of relationship 
termination modeled upon family law applied? Suppose that 
employment law focused on easing the transition to independence 
and recognizing investment by providing notice, transitional support, 
and compensation for investment? In short, why should a different 
legal regime apply to marriage, marriage-like intimate relationships, 
and caregiving arrangements than to the employment context?
78
 The 
remainder of this Essay explores these questions.  
 
 76. Id.  
 77. Even the phrase ―arm‘s length‖ connotes images of connection and closeness as well 
as distance and separation: a handshake, the metaphor associated with contractual ―arm‘s-
length‖ relationships, represents after all a physical connection, the touching of two bodies. 
Martha M. Ertman, Private Ordering Under the ALI Principles: As Natural as Status, in 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE‘S PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 284, 296 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). 
 78. Or, for that matter, why do marriage and marriage-like relationships warrant a 
different analysis than other intimate relationships, such as friendships? See Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (arguing that family law‘s 
silence on the subject of friendship as a source of substantial resources and obligations 
maintains a divide between marriage and friendship that perpetuates gender inequality); see 
also Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631 (2007) (arguing for a law that 
facilitates and recognizes friendship). 
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III. MARRIAGE AND EMPLOYMENT: COMMON ROOTS, DIVERGENT 
LEGAL FRAMES 
Marriage and employment share a common status-based 
genealogy in master-servant law.
79
 The household model in which the 
master provided for and controlled his family and servants was 
transported to the pre-industrial workplace, and along with it 
assumptions about the proper order of things that were based upon 
custom and ideology.
80
 Like marriage, work was seen as ―enabling 
and redemptive,‖
81
 ―a source of spiritual or secular enhancement of 
the self.‖
82
 Both marriage and employment initially emphasized 
―bonds of loyalty, subservience, and one-directional joint 
endeavor.‖
83
 Both represented an amalgam of contract and status that 
defined the ―total legal situation of the individual.‖
84
 Though the 
parties might contract as to some terms, the background rules for the 
relationship were prescribed by custom and ultimately embedded in 
standard form contracts supplied by law (the at-will rule for 
American workers; the marriage contract for intimate relationships 
for which the parties sought formal legal recognition); ―it was never 
contemplated that the parties would design their own relationship.‖
85
  
A. Employment Law: From Status to Contract 
Nevertheless, the legal rules and theoretical frames for the two 
institutions soon diverged. Beginning in the nineteenth century, 
 
 79. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53 TULANE L. REV. 
697, 698–99 (1979). 
 80. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 13–
14 (1983). 
 81. Id. at 14.  
 82. Id. at 15. 
 83. Id. at 13.  
 84. Id. at 11 (quoting PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 54 
(1969)) (describing employment arrangement as a ―status contract‖ with very different 
characteristics from traditional arm‘s-length contracts). 
 85. Id. at 13–14 (quoting ALAN FOX, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER & TRUST 
RELATIONS 185 (1974)); see also SELZNICK, supra note 84, at 136 (―The law could not and did 
not treat the conditions of employment as the outcome of free bargaining and mutual assent. 
Rather, the concept of contract was adapted to what had to be done to maintain the 
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employment law embraced a contractual framework in recognition of 
the centrality of employment arrangements to the exchange economy. 
The law of the market presumed that employment contracts entailed 
the voluntary exchange of freely-bargained promises by relative 
equals negotiating at arm‘s length.
86
  
The English rule applicable to employment was originally a 
default presumption of employment for a period of one year with 
mutual requirements of reasonable notice.
87
 In the United States, 
however, the one-year presumption and notice requirement soon gave 
way to a default rule of free terminability, which gained purchase in 
1877 with the publication of Horace Wood‘s treatise on master-
servant law.
88
 American courts have since embraced the doctrine of 
employment at will for employment relationships of undefined 
duration, subject to certain exceptions developed at common law or 
imposed by statute.
89
 Pursuant to the at-will doctrine, either the 
employer or the employee may terminate the employment 
relationship at any time and for any reason without notice.
90
 The 
doctrine is justified by the contractual principle of mutuality: both 
worker and employer are equally free to quit at any time in order to 
 
 86. ATLESON, supra note 80, at 11–12. 
 87. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 118, 119 (1976) (discussing Blackstone‘s rule that employment was presumed to be for 
one year, and explaining that although the rule was rooted in concerns about equity in situations 
of seasonal labor where either employer or employee could leave the other in the lurch 
unexpectedly, it applied to all classes of workers, even non-agricultural workers). 
 88. See HORACE WOOD, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 133 (1877). 
 89. For interesting discussions of the evolution and spread of the employment at will 
doctrine, see Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an 
Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 453 (2008) 
(explaining that the at-will doctrine spread across the country as states competed with one 
another to attract capital investment); Feinman, supra note 87, at 131 (1976) (arguing that the 
employment at will rule spread from salaried managers to manual workers, functioning as ―an 
adjunct to the development of advanced capitalism in America‖); Sanford M. Jacoby, The 
Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical 
Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85 (1982) (suggesting that weak U.S. labor unions failed to combat 
the application of at-will employment to manual laborers, and the rule then spread to salaried 
managers). See generally CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 7, at 100–07. For a thoughtful 
exploration of the relationship between employment and the master-servant doctrine in the 
nineteenth century, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLIN, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993). 
 90. See Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (―All [employers] may 
dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for 
cause morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of legal wrong.‖).  
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maximize their gains in the market.
91
 The law envisions employers as 
nimble actors required to respond quickly to market shifts, and 
workers as free agents bargaining for the most advantageous terms of 
employment and moving on to greener pastures as more attractive 
opportunities beckon.  
The potential for the exploitation of less powerful workers in 
slack labor markets loomed large, and law eventually stepped in to 
regulate employment through statutes establishing minimum terms, 
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act
92
 (wage and hour law) and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act
93
 (workplace health and safety 
standards), and statutes prohibiting discrimination, such as Title 
VII,
94
 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
95
 and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act.
96
 The National Labor Relations Act 
protected workers‘ rights to organize labor unions, which negotiated 
collective bargaining agreements protecting workers‘ job security, 
among other benefits.
97
 In the 1970s and 1980s, state courts in many 
jurisdictions developed a common law of wrongful discharge carving 
out exceptions to the at-will doctrine, some predicated on tort 
principles, others grounded in contract.
98
 Courts were particularly 
receptive to claims for breach of implied contract by employees who 
were able to point to oral or written representations of job security 
(―If you do a good job, you‘ll have a job for life‖), plus longevity of 
employment and a pattern of employer actions that induced reliance 
upon those promises, such as raises, promotion, positive employment 
 
 91. For scholarly defenses of the at-will rule, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the 
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Richard W. Power, A Defense of the 
Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 881 (1983). Other scholars would accept some 
limits on the doctrine, particularly prohibitions on discrimination. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, 
Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 
(1993). 
 92. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006) (establishing a 
federal minimum wage and requiring the payment of overtime wages for hours worked in 
excess of forty per week). 
 93. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006). 
 94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006). 
 95. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006). 
 96. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 97. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
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evaluations, and lack of disciplinary action.
99
 Some claims were 
based upon representations made in employee handbooks.
100
 A 
minority of courts were also initially receptive to claims for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, though they soon 
made clear that such claims sounded in contract, not in tort—
rendering them largely superfluous.
101
  
Nevertheless, the at-will doctrine still holds powerful sway. As the 
Velez and Steelman cases illustrate, work law remains firmly 
committed to a contract model of regulation predicated on the image 
of an impersonal cash-for-labor transaction featuring easy exit and no 
affective ties. Despite their success in negotiating for job security in 
the form of just-cause-for-discharge provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements, labor unions have not challenged the larger 
cash-for-labor frame. Rather than pressing social justice and broader 
political agendas, unions concentrated their resources on advancing 
the ―immediate and practical concerns‖ of their members at the 
bargaining table, negotiating for fair wages, increased job security, 
and improved working conditions—the ―bread and butter‖ of 
employment.
102
 Plaintiffs‘ lawyers likewise had little practical 
incentive to argue for reconceptualizing work as something more 
than a cold-cash-for-labor bargain since prevailing on this argument 
would deprive individual worker-plaintiffs of the ―employee status‖ 
required for protection under many regulatory regimes in 
employment, as Velez and Steelman demonstrate.
103
 When unions and 
 
 99. See, e.g., Pugh v. See‘s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) 
(enforcing implied contract for thirty-two-year employee who alleged a promise that his future 
was secure and a pattern of raises and promotions consistent with that promise). See generally 
CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 7, at 114–78 (collecting cases). 
 100. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1259 n.2, 1265 (N.J. 
1985) (enforcing handbook promise to ―retain to the extent consistent with company 
requirements, the services of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and 
effectively‖); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626–27 (Minn. 1983) 
(enforcing handbook provisions that described stability of employment in the banking industry 
and provided a four-step process for dismissal). 
 101. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387, 401 (Cal. 1988) (recognizing 
claim but limiting damages to contractual damages); cf. Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 448 
N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (rejecting claim). 
 102. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767, 
1779–80 (2001) (describing ideology of business unionism adopted by organized labor after 
World War II). 
 103. See Fischl, supra note 6, at 866 (discussing pressure on plaintiffs‘ lawyers to fashion 
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plaintiffs‘ lawyers did make more transformative arguments—that 
workers should be treated as equal partners with the employer in the 
employment relationship, just as non-titled spouses were in 
community property regimes (and later, in equitable distribution 
systems)—the arguments were promptly dismissed as too radical.
104
  
B. Marriage and Family Law: Mired in Status 
Marriage law evolved along a different path, embracing status 
rather than contract as its organizing principle.
105
 This status-based 
 
legal arguments that accept the premises of the regime of self-interest in order to win protection 
for individual workers in particular cases); see also Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of 
Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 857, 956 (2008) (discussing definition of ―employee‖ for purposes of Fair Labor 
Standards Act protection).  
 Employee advocates have sometimes used a psychological contract frame identified by 
organizational behavior scholars to press for implied contractual terms limiting the bases for 
discharge, a strategy that helped to ground the implied contract exception to the employment at 
will doctrine. See Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract Formation and 
Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and Empirical Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 647 (1994); see also Denise M. Rousseau, Psychological Contracts in the Workplace: 
Understanding the Ties that Motivate, 18 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 120 (2004). The phrase 
―psychological contract‖ in this context refers to a worker‘s beliefs regarding the terms and 
conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between worker and employer. Such 
perceptions, if based upon observable behaviors of the firm, whether formal or informal, 
explicit or implicit, may give rise to implied-in-fact contract claims based upon employee 
reliance. See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917; Woolley. 491 A.2d at 1265 (N.J. 1985) (finding 
provisions of an employee handbook enforceable and noting the benefits of loyalty and union 
avoidance that the employer reaped from shaping employee expectations). While the 
psychological contract construct is not itself particularly reliant on proof of affect or emotion, 
violation of psychological contracts is associated with strong emotional reactions such as 
feelings of betrayal. See, e.g., Judy Pate & Charles Malone, Post-“Psychological Contract” 
Violation: The Durability and Transferability of Employee Perceptions: The Case of Tim-Tec, 
24 J. EUR. INDUS. TRAINING 158, 161 (2000) (describing intense emotional reaction by 
employees to employer‘s decision to discharge striking employees and hire new ones, including 
statements such as ―I would go out of my way to ruin TimTec. I hate them with a passion.‖). 
 104. See Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 
(6th Cir. 1980) (dismissing claim by workers, Congressman from the Youngstown district, and 
the Attorney-General of Ohio that a community property right had arisen in the steel mills 
owned by U.S. Steel that prevented the mill‘s owners from imploding the mill and leaving the 
community in a state of waste); see also First Nat‘l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676–
79 (1981) (denying union‘s claim that employer must bargain with the union over a decision to 
terminate a contract with a customer where the decision resulted in job losses, and observing 
that ―Congress had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal 
partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union‘s members are employed‖). 
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set of rights and obligations furthered the state‘s interest in protecting 
vulnerable parties—children, and dependent spouses—who could fall 
into poverty if the relationship with the primary breadwinner 
dissolved.
106
 American marriage law initially reflected the English 
tradition of a ―divorceless society‖: absolute divorce was difficult or 
impossible to obtain, and divorce from bed and board (effectively a 
legal separation) could be obtained only for cause.
107
 In general, 
divorce was available only if one party proved that the other was 
guilty of fault, such as adultery, desertion, or cruelty.  
Rules restricting exit from marriage eased beginning in the 1970s 
with the enactment of no-fault divorce law in California; other states 
soon followed.
108
 No-fault divorce law permits a divorce by one party 
over the other‘s objection upon proof of irretrievable breakdown of 
the marriage, incompatibility, irreconcilable differences, or in many 
jurisdictions, simply by enduring a separation for a fixed period of 
time; waiting periods prior to finalizing the divorce may vary 
depending upon whether both spouses consent.
109
 Family law also 
creates rights to alimony or spousal support at divorce for those who 
can establish need, inability to support themselves, and proof that the 
other spouse can afford to pay.
110
 Though less common now than 
they were in the past, alimony awards have the potential to continue 
for decades, even for life, in appropriate cases, and are subject to 
revision upon proof of changed circumstances.
111
 The state‘s interest 
 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 12).  
 106. Id. at 13.  
 107. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204 (2d ed. 1985). 
 108. Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. 
REV. 291, 292 (1987). Some form of no-fault divorce has been available in all fifty states since 
1985. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Looking 
at Interjurisdictional Recognition, 42 FAM. L.Q. 923, 972–73 (2010). Although New York had 
perhaps the most restrictive version of no-fault divorce law, conditioning divorce on a 
separation agreement settling property division issues, it adopted a true no-fault divorce law in 
August 2010. Paterson Signs No-Fault Divorce Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at A14. 
 109. DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE 26 (1995). 
 110. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 
506 (2005).  
 111. Alimony stemmed from the era when absolute divorce was unavailable, and a legal 
separation—divorce from bed and board—was the only legal dissolution possible. Since a 
divorce from bed and board was not really a divorce at all, the duty of support continued in the 
form of alimony. Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1989); 
see, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958–2008, 
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in ensuring that ex-spouses do not end up on the public dole is so 
powerful that courts can and do reopen divorce settlements decades 
later to avoid it.
112
  
No-fault divorce law was accompanied by a significant shift in 
marital property law in the non-community property states. The title 
rules that had originally governed marital property division at divorce 
in the non-community property states (he who earns it, owns it) gave 
way to equitable distribution principles and a partnership theory that 
recognized the non-financial contributions of homemakers and 
caregivers to the acquisition of marital assets.
113
 Modern marriage 
law is thus characterized by powerful images of partnership.
114
 
Equitable distribution law allows property division regardless of title 
based upon consideration of contribution/investment in the 
acquisition of marital property, marital duration, the need, reliance, 
and expectation interests that generally accompany marriages of 
significant duration, and in a few jurisdictions, marital fault.  
Feminist scholars were instrumental in directly challenging the 
love/money dichotomy in family law, arguing persuasively that 
 
42 FAM. L.Q. 419, 431–33 (2008) (noting that spousal support is typically awarded only in long 
marriages—at least ten years‘ duration—and is more likely to be for a fixed term than for an 
indefinite period). 
 112. See Jennifer Levitz, The New Art of Alimony, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009, at W 
(describing cases).  
 The law‘s commitment to marriage as status and to the state‘s role as protector of the 
vulnerable is perhaps best illustrated by the law‘s historical hostility toward prenuptial 
contracts. Nearly all states refused to enforce them until relatively recently. See Brian Bix, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: Premarital Agreements and How We Think About 
Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 150 (1998). Although this hostility has receded and 
nearly all states now enforce them, courts typically limit the types of clauses that are 
enforceable and subject them to a relatively rigorous review for fairness, voluntariness, and 
unconscionability. See Bix, supra note 105, at 17–19. Agreements made during marriage are 
viewed with even more skepticism, as courts worry that one party may take advantage of the 
other‘s vulnerability and extort agreement with a threat to leave the relationship. Id. at 20–22.  
 113. Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The 
Ascendancy of Self Over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 62 (2001). Kelly argues 
that the theory is in fact a pretense, and shows its lack of credibility by pointing to the triumph 
of individualism when it comes to division of career assets such as professional degrees, which 
are not considered jointly owned despite the mutual investment in obtaining them during 
marriage. Id. 
 114. See Susan Etta Keller, The Rhetoric of Marriage, Achievement, and Power: An 
Analysis of Judicial Opinions Considering the Treatment of Professional Degrees as Marital 
Property, 21 VT. L. REV. 409, 422 (1997) (discussing analogy of marriage to a business 
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characterizing marriage as only and always about intimacy was 
simply another way of devaluing women‘s unpaid homemaking and 
caretaking work.
115
 These scholars advanced proposals for valuing 
and compensating unpaid homemaking and caretaking work that had 
significant practical application at divorce.
116
 Some commentators, 
most notably Susan Prager, argued that marital property law should 
privilege sharing principles in order to foster accommodation and 
compromise, conduct essential to a strong marriage.
117
 The 
partnership theory of marriage thus furthered norms of cooperation 
and solidarity rather than individualism, and recognized that decision 
making in a relationship that included expectations of continuity and 




Since Marvin v. Marvin, the law has also recognized the property 
rights of nonmarital cohabitants in jointly acquired/created property 
through implied contract claims and equitable theories such as 
quantum meruit, restitution, constructive trust, and unjust enrichment 
(so-called ―palimony‖ claims).
119
 However, the courts remain 
obsessed with severing any aspect of the arrangement that might 
imply that sexual services are being exchanged for compensation, lest 




 115. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994) (arguing that the family wage should be viewed as jointly owned, 
regardless of who holds title to the wages vis-à-vis the employer who pays them, and arguing 
for income equalization between the two post-divorce households); Joan M. Krauskopf & 
Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law 
of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 586–91 (1974) (proposing partnership model of the family in 
order to enhance the value of women‘s unwaged caretaking work). Some argued that this 
devaluation slopped over onto the paid caregiver, as well. See Silbaugh, supra note 18, at 72–
79.  
 116. See sources cited supra note 115. 
 117. Susan Westerberg Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 
25 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1977); see also Sally Burnett Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The 
Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195, 199 (1987). 
 118. Prager, supra note 117, at 6, 12. 
 119. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); see also Shahar Lifshitz, Married 
Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1565 (2009) (arguing that the law should offer a distinct and separate regime for 
cohabiting couples in which couples might choose among a menu of different formats 
depending upon the duration and circumstances of their cohabitation, all of which blend a right 
of free exit with a partnership model of marital property). 
 120. See Hasday, supra note 110, at 507–09. 
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recently, advocates for gay and lesbian couples seeking access to 
marriage have also challenged the love/money dichotomy in the 
marriage context, sometimes focusing on the economic benefits of 
marriage to persuade courts that it is unjust to exclude same-sex 
couples from access to the institution.
121
 
C. Evolving Toward the Middle: The Influence of Shifting Norms 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a few scholars noted the 
opposite paths along which employment and marriage were evolving: 
employment was becoming less readily terminable (through the 
enactment of statutes constraining the employer‘s ability to discharge 
and through the common law‘s embrace of exceptions to the 
employment at will rule) and marriage was becoming more readily 
terminable (through the enactment of no-fault divorce law).
122
 Mary 
Ann Glendon concluded that ―in law and in fact it is easier to get rid 
of your spouse than your employee,‖ and argued that employment 
was usurping the role that family had once played in furthering 
wealth acquisition and class status.
123
  
Subsequently, however, cultural norms and market realities 
shifted, causing both institutions to evolve toward the middle. Labor 
markets once characterized by stable employment, longer job tenure 
and strong internal firm career ladders reversed course, and the 
common law development of exceptions to the doctrine of 
employment at will stalled. Employers offered a ―new deal‖ in which 
re-employability and skills training replaced job security; union 
density declined precipitously, and with it the number of workers 
covered by job security provisions in collective bargaining 
agreements; and work was reconstituted so that increasing numbers 
 
 121. See, e.g., Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (ruling that denial to same-sex 
partners of the privileges associated with marriage violated the common benefits clause of the 
state constitution). 
 122. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 79, at 699; Power, supra note 91, at 889–91 (noting the 
same parallel evolutionary paths, and arguing for a return to a strong version of the employment 
at will default rule on the basis of the unidirectional nature of the risk assumed by the 
employer). 
 123. Glendon, supra note 79, at 705. But cf. Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 9 (arguing that 
wives received more protection against unpredictable dismissal and financial hardship, 
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of workers led nomadic lifestyles as contingent employees or 
independent contractors.
124
 Market values invaded the home 
sphere.
125
 Marriage destabilized as women entered the workforce in 
increasing numbers, divorce became even easier to obtain, and 
marital property law emphasized a ―clean break‖ philosophy that 
favored property division over continued dependence and alimony 
obligations. As Martha Fineman summed it up, by the early 1990s 
marriage was transformed into a ―voluntary (and therefore, perhaps, 
temporary) union of equals which either may terminate ‗at-will‘ if it 
does not satisfy their desires and needs.‖
126
  
As norms concerning the meaning and duration of marriage and 
employment converged, scholars observing both institutions noticed 
striking parallels in the perceptions of entrants.
127
 In particular, a 
mismatch existed between their beliefs about the likely stability of 
the relationship they were beginning and their expectations about the 
law‘s response should the relationship founder. Both groups display a 
strong tendency toward over-optimism at the outset of a relationship, 
and accordingly take few steps to protect themselves, even when they 




 124. See STONE, supra note 5; Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: 
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
519 (2001). By the end of 2010, union density had declined to less than 12 percent, with private 
sector union membership falling below 7 percent. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Union Members—2010 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ 
union2.pdf.  
 125. See Crain, supra note 36, at 1917–28. 
 126. Martha Albertson Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for 
Distribution of Property at Divorce, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL 
THEORY 265, 266 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991). 
 127. See, e.g., Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-
Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
733, 737 (2009); Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the 
Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1801 (1996). See generally Neil D. Weinstein, 
Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 
(1980). 
 128. See Laura Petrecca, Unromantic? Maybe, But Prenups Make Sense, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 8, 2010, at 1B (describing results of a Harris poll finding that although one-third of adults 
say they would ask a significant other to sign a prenuptial agreement, only 3 percent of spouses 
or engaged persons actually have such an agreement). The tendency toward over-optimism 
apparently stems from our common belief that we are ―above average,‖ and thus are less likely 
than the average person to experience negative events such as divorce or discharge. The 
tendency toward over-confidence derives from our habit of interpreting ambiguous information 
in self-serving ways. Williams, supra note 127, at 737; Issacharoff, supra note 127, at 1801. 
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are concerned with signaling lack of commitment at the outset of the 
relationship.
129
 Finally, both also seem confident that the law will 
protect them if the relationship fails. 
Entrants to marriage certainly understand intellectually that the 
odds of divorce are high and that their marital vows are aspirational 
rather than legally binding, yet they nevertheless cling to statistically 
unfounded beliefs that their marriages will not founder: although 
most entrants to marriage correctly believe that 50 percent of 
marriages end in divorce, on average individuals predict that their 
own chance for divorce is 10 percent.
130
 Most also believe that their 
ex-spouses will deal fairly with them and that the law will protect 
them if their marriages do founder.
131
 Although new spouses 
accurately predict that courts award alimony in 40 to 50 percent of 
cases, over 80 percent believe that a court would award alimony in 
their case.
132
 Further, though new spouses predict that 20 percent of 
women who are awarded alimony are unable to collect it, 100 percent 
believe that their spouse would pay it.
133
  
Nor would most take advantage of the ability to bind their spouses 
more tightly by contract if it were available. Experiments with 
covenant marriage in Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona suggest that 
most new entrants into marriage see no need to inject additional legal 
force into the vows they utter; only 2 percent of new marriage 
entrants in Louisiana elect covenant marriage, a rate similar to those 




 129. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 118–19 (1997) 
[hereinafter Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information] (noting that the issue of job security 
is unlikely to be raised at the outset of the employment relationship: employees fear signaling 
shirking, while employers fear attracting shirkers).  
 130. Williams, supra note 127, at 757–58. 
 131. Id. at 735, 758. 
 132. Id. at 758. In fact, however, alimony is typically awarded in only 10 to 15 percent of 
cases. See Kathrine C. Daniels et al., Alternative Formulas for Distributing Parental Incomes at 
Divorce, 27 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 4, 6 (2006). 
 133. Williams, supra note 127, at 758. 
 134. Covenant marriage restricts both entry into and exit from marriage in order to 
strengthen couples‘ commitment to the institution. In Louisiana, the first state to adopt this 
variation on the standard form marriage contract, covenant marriage has three attributes that 
distinguish it from traditional/standard-form marriage: premarital counseling is mandatory; the 
couple is obligated to pursue all options to preserve the marriage prior to dissolution; and 
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Workers, on the other hand, do not generally believe that 
employment is for life. Nevertheless, they consistently underestimate 
the likelihood that they will be discharged,
 
and persist in the legally 
erroneous belief that they cannot be discharged except for cause, 
regardless of employer disclaimers to the contrary.
135
 They rely 
instead upon their own notions of justice and fairness, reinforced by 
the firm‘s actual behavior toward them; for example, most well-
advised firms follow progressive disciplinary policies.
136
  
These erroneous expectations regarding the likely endurance of 
marital and employment relationships have proved highly resistant to 
influence by law.
137
 Although the misperceptions result from a 
mismatch between cultural norms and the law and thus should be 
theoretically reparable through law reform, insulating strategies 
 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272 to 9:276 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); see Katherine Shaw Spaht, 
Covenant Marriage Seven Years Later: Its As Yet Unfulfilled Promise, 65 LA. L. REV. 605, 
612–15 (2005). In Arizona, divorce is available on fault grounds or no-fault grounds (separation 
for at least one year after a separation decree or two years without a decree, or upon mutual 
agreement). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009). Arkansas 
allows divorce only on fault grounds and where the parties have been separated for two years 
after entry of a decree of separation; if a minor child exists, the separation must continue for 
two and one-half years after the date of the separation decree. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-801 to 
9-11-811 (2009). Opponents of covenant marriage argue that its existence undermines 
commitment in traditional marriage and erodes the institution. See, e.g., Kimberly Diane White, 
Note, Covenant Marriage: An Unnecessary Second Attempt at Fault-Based Divorce, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 869 (2010); Jonathan Mummolo, Va. Foundation Seeks to Reduce Divorces, WASH. POST, 
July 26, 2007, at B1. 
 135. Weinstein, supra note 127, at 810 tbl.1; see also Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, 
and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 
465, 479–80 [hereinafter Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law] (arguing that workers overestimate 
their rights because they confuse law with norms and believe ―that the law prohibits what 
fairness forbids‖); Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information, supra note 129, at 155 
(reporting results of empirical study that suggests that workers believe they have protection 
against arbitrary discharge even where employers inform them otherwise). But see Williams, 
supra note 127, at 770 (suggesting that employees have a ―roughly accurate sense of their 
chances of being fired‖). 
 136. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why 
Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 9–10 (2002) (explaining that employees‘ belief in rights 
to job security absent just cause for discharge are a rational response to employer policies that 
implicitly communicate that norm); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 121 (2002) (arguing that switching to a default rule of just cause for 
discharge would more effectively protect employees in subsequent negotiations with 
employers). 
 137. See Williams, supra note 127, at 736; Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law, supra note 
135, at 465. 
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(aligning the law more closely with prevailing expectations) and 
debiasing strategies (seeking to correct the information asymmetry) 
seem inadequate to the task of countering deeply held religious and 
romantic ideals in the marriage context and gross inequalities in 
bargaining power in the employment context. Not only is it difficult 
to persuade the parties to think about the demise of the relationship 
while they are under the spell of the rosy haze of romantic coupling 
or hiring, but the situation is complicated by the dilemma of 
bargaining against a backdrop of significant inequality in bargaining 
power, the challenge of information asymmetries between more 
powerful and less powerful parties, concerns about signaling a lack of 
commitment at the outset of the relationship, and the inherent 
inability to predict or anticipate the degree of one‘s investment in the 
relationship over time, and thus to foresee the effects of dissolution of 
the relationship in the future.
138
 Some scholars conclude that even 
switching default rules may not protect the interests of the parties in a 
long term relationship, because their interests change over time as 
they invest in ways that cannot be anticipated at the outset.
139
  
Moreover, as some have observed, optimism in these contexts 
may be functional, and correcting it could have collateral costs.
140
 
Optimism in romantic relationships may be an important precondition 
for a successful and enduring marriage; there is some evidence that 
optimistic romantic partners perceive their mates as more nurturing 
and supportive, which increases the likelihood that the marriage will 
be happy and will endure.
141
 Employee optimism improves worker 
morale because workers view their employers as more supportive, 
which in turn affects job satisfaction and performance and enhances 
the duration of the relationship.
142
  
How heavily, then, should the law‘s assumptions about the 
parties‘ presumed intent based upon their acceptance of the standard 
form nature of the marriage contract (―for life‖) or the employment 
 
 138. Issacharoff, supra note 127, at 1794–95, 1801. 
 139. Id. at 1795–96, 1800 (arguing for a return to the default rule of hiring for a presumed 
term, with the burden placed on the party with information and bargaining power to clearly 
specify employment terms that deviate therefrom). 
 140. Williams, supra note 127, at 736. 
 141. Id. 
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contract (―at-will‖) weigh in characterizing these relationships for 
purposes of regulating termination? Under current law, these fictional 
default rules—that love and marriage last for life, and that 
employment is temporary and tenuous—powerfully influence the 
law‘s categorization process. Consider, for example, the Steelman 
court‘s reliance on the couple‘s asserted intention to form a 
partnership ―in perpetuity.‖
143
 Such a forward-looking expectation 
was something the court saw as characteristic of love, not labor; 
indeed, it was fundamentally inconsistent with employment at will. 
Moreover, even if Steelman had succeeded in her bid to be 
categorized as an employee for purposes of her FLSA compensation 
claim, her recovery would have been limited to the minimum wage 
for the hours that she could prove that she had worked.
144
 Employees 
who can be discharged at any time for any reason have no future or 
long-term interest in the business enterprise; thus, their recovery can 
be only the value of their actual labor—not the value of their 
forward-looking expectation interest or their reliance interest. Yet, a 
spouse or nonmarital cohabitant could claim a property interest based 
upon the very same contribution because the belief that marriage or 
an intimate relationship will last forever would be seen as rational, no 
matter how objectively unrealistic that belief may be. 
IV. RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY AND PROPERTY CLAIMS TO 
THE RESCUE? 
Marriage and employment contracts are classic examples of 
relational contracts.
145
 In contrast to transactional contracts—one-
 
 143. Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 144. Id. at 128.  
 145. See Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 823 (2000) (marriage); Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational 
Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 153–54 (2005) (employment). Collective bargaining 
in a unionized context also epitomizes the relational contract: the parties deliberately negotiate a 
contract with open terms, intentional gaps, reserved discretion for one party or the other and 
built-in dispute resolution mechanisms, precisely because the duration of the arrangement 
makes it difficult to forecast future needs. Business arrangements can also be relational in 
nature, where they are of longstanding duration, entail investment unique to that business 
transaction, and interdependence between the companies develops. See, e.g., Oglebay Norton 
Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515 (Ohio 1990) (requiring parties to a twenty-three-year-long 
business relationship in which Oglebay transported Armco‘s iron ore over the Great Lakes from 
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time commoditized exchanges of labor or goods for cash that are 
made out of self-interest and require minimal personal interaction—
relational contracts are characterized by longer duration, forward-
looking cooperation, mutual investment, and personal 
relationships.
146
 Where duration and forward-looking relational 
interactions characterize the arrangement, many scholars have argued 
that the law should embrace implied contracts created out of duration 
and daily living that reflect the actual development of the relationship 
rather than adhering to a more formal model of contract.
147
 
Could relational contract theory substitute for the rigid cash-for-
labor transaction model that currently dominates work law? Robert 
Bird has argued, for example, that the law should harness relational 
contract theory to hold liable employers who engage in ―relational 
opportunism‖ (inducing employees to forge a psychological contract 
with the firm and reaping the benefits of increased loyalty, but then 
violating the implicit contract by terminating employees at will).
148
 
Despite some initial movement in this direction, the possibilities have 
not been realized. Most jurisdictions today recognize claims for 
breach of implied contract, varying the at-will rule.
149
 The strength of 
the law‘s commitment to at the at-will principle in the employment 
arena has significantly limited the success of such claims, however. 
Courts intent upon resisting erosion of the at-will doctrine have 
refused to enforce implied contract claims on the basis that oral 
representations violate the Statute of Frauds, that oral representations 
or handbook provisions are insufficiently definite to ground a 
contract,
150
 or by enforcing disclaimers indicating that nothing said 
 
its mines to its plants to negotiate and mediate each shipping season for the duration of a 
contract when they were unable to agree upon a mutually satisfactory rate following a downturn 
in the iron and steel industry). 
 146. See IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF 
IAN MACNEIL (David Campbell ed., 2001); Symposium, Relational Contract Theory: 
Unanswered Questions, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2000). 
 147. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 895–98 (1978). 
But see Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
847, 871–75 (2000) (defending the role of formalism in relational contracts). 
 148. Bird, supra note 145, at 198–200. 
 149. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 1993); Hunt v. IBM 
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was intended to modify the at-will arrangement.
151
 Equitable 
arguments founded upon principles of promissory estoppel have 
enjoyed very limited success.
152
  
Nor have courts been willing to import marital-property type 
principles directly into the employment arena, even when the facts 
cry out for relief. In Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. 
United States Steel Corp., the Sixth Circuit denied what it 
characterized as ―a cry for help from steelworkers and townspeople in 
the City of Youngstown, Ohio,‖ who sought to resist the closing of 
two steel mills that employed 3,500 workers and had been the 
lifeblood of the community since the early 1900s.
153
 Acknowledging 
the dependence of both the workers and the community of 
Youngstown on the steel mills, the court nonetheless refused to reify 
the powerful symbiotic relationship by ordering U.S. Steel to 
continue to operate the mills or by restraining the piecemeal sale or 
demolition of the mills so that they could be sold to the plaintiffs for 
operation as a going concern through a community corporation.
154
 
The ruling dashed the plaintiffs‘ early hopes, which had been stoked 
by the district court‘s suggestion in its initial decision on the 
plaintiffs‘ application for a preliminary injunction that plaintiffs 
amend their complaint to assert a property-based interest mirroring 
that of a long-time spouse in a marital property context. The district 
court explained its initial receptivity to the theory in this way: 
 Everything that has happened in the Mahoning Valley has 
been happening for many years because of steel. Schools have 
been built, roads have been built. Expansion that has taken 
place is because of steel. And to accommodate that industry, 
lives and destinies of the inhabitants of that community were 
based and planned on the basis of that institution: Steel. 
 
 151. See, e.g., Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 611 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 2005); Wilkinson v. 
Shoney‘s, Inc., 4 P.3d 1149 (Kan. 2000). 
 152. See Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the 
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 21–26 (1999) (observing that low success rate of 
promissory estoppel claims in the employment setting is attributable to ―judicial veneration for 
the at-will employment rule‖). 
 153. 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (6th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs included two labor unions, the 
Congressman from the Youngstown district, and the Attorney-General of Ohio. Id. at 1265. 
 154. Id. at 1266.  
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. . . . 
 We are talking about an institution, a large corporate 
institution that is virtually the reason for the existence of that 
segment of this nation (Youngstown). Without it, that segment 
of this nation perhaps suffers, instantly and severely. Whether 
it becomes a ghost town or not, I don‘t know. . . . 
. . . . 
 But what has happened over the years between U.S. Steel, 
Youngstown and the inhabitants? Hasn‘t something come out 
of that relationship . . . [?] 
. . . . 
. . . I think the law can recognize the property right to the 
extent that U.S. Steel cannot leave that Mahoning Valley and 
the Youngstown area in a state of waste, that it cannot 
completely abandon its obligation to that community, because 




 The plaintiffs amended their complaint in response, adding a 
claim for vindication of their ―community property‖ rights.
156
 Despite 
the district court‘s apparent sympathy for the plaintiffs, however, it 
ultimately denied their claims for breach of contract and promissory 
estoppel, as well as the novel claim for division of ―community 
property‖ that the court had previously invited. The Sixth Circuit 
court affirmed, reasoning that there was no basis in law for a legally 




 155. Id. at 1279–80 (emphasis omitted).  
 156. Id. at 1280.  
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V. RETHINKING EMPLOYMENT AS RELATIONSHIP 
Although many scholars have criticized family law for not going 
far enough to promote sharing principles and failing to adequately 
protect the reliance interests of the dependent (typically non-wage-
earning or secondary-earner) spouse, employment law has lagged far 
behind family law in its ability to recognize the interplay between 
love and money at termination of the relationship.
158
 Critically, 
family law takes account of the dependent party‘s need for time to 
deal with the pain of termination of the relationship and financial 
support to weather the transition to independence. Although exiting 
marriage was made easier by the enactment of no-fault divorce 
regimes allowing unilateral divorce, divorce law in most jurisdictions 
still requires notice and waiting periods, and many states require 
mediation or divorce counseling at termination of the relationship. 
Spousal support and rehabilitative alimony are available to ease the 
financial transition, functioning as a form of ―severance pay‖ or 
―unemployment benefit‖ to compensate the non-titled spouse for her 
lost investment and ease the transition into either a new marriage or 
the waged labor market.
159
 A significant number of jurisdictions 
 
 158. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 113; Shari Motro, Labor, Luck, and Love: Reconsidering 
the Sanctity of Separate Property, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1627, 1631 (2008) (arguing that 
the ―revolution‖ in marital property law from title theory to equitable distribution was 
incomplete, and proposing that spouses be required to share preexisting separate property, 
inherited property, and gifted property to the extent that such assets shape the parties‘ identities 
during the marriage); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers, Myths, and the Law of Divorce: One More 
Feminist Case for Partnership, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203 (2006) (arguing for 
partnership analogy to support the value of mothering activities in marriage); Alicia Brokars 
Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution at Divorce: In 
Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN‘S L.J. 141, 145 (2004) (arguing that the theory 
of partnership marriage be strengthened by conceptualizing earning power acquired during 
marriage as marital property and that all claims to wealth division at divorce be understood as 
property rights); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 75 (2004) (arguing for division of human capital acquired during marriage). 
 159. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 153 (6th ed. 2003). Posner 
observes that alimony is most critical where age depreciates the wife‘s ability to form a new 
marriage that will be as profitable as the dissolving marriage was. Mark Ellman explains 
further:  
[T]he traditional wife makes her marital investment early in the expectation of a 
deferred return: sharing in the fruits of her husband‘s eventual market success. The 
traditional husband realizes his gains from the marriage in its early years, in the form 
of increased earning capacity and the production of children; his contribution is 
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consider fault relevant to the financial aspects of property division or 
support at divorce, a rough equivalent to a just-cause-for-discharge 
rule that shifts power to the innocent party at termination. While there 
may be ―Fifty Ways to Leave Your Lover,‖ dissolving a marriage—
particularly one of significant duration—is neither costless nor easy. 
Exiting employment, on the other hand, remains a quick process 
largely devoid of notice and waiting periods.
160
 Severance pay or 
 
deferred until the marriage‘s later years when he shares the fruits of his enhanced 
earning capacity with his wife. In any relationship in which the flow of payments and 
benefits to the parties is not symmetrical over time, there is a great temptation to cheat. 
The party who has already received a benefit has an incentive to terminate the 
relationship before the balance of payments shifts. The traditional marriage, like the 
machinery necessary for production of a customized part, is a risky investment in the 
absence of an enforceable long-term contract. 
 Noneconomic factors exacerbate the wife‘s difficulty. The spouses‘ respective 
marriageability, if they divorce and seek new partners, follows a different pattern as 
they age. Prevailing social mores, relatively universal and apparently intractable, cause 
the woman‘s appeal as a sexual partner to decline more rapidly with age than does the 
man‘s. Moreover, even though the man‘s appeal as a sexual partner also declines with 
age, the financial assets he brings to a marriage typically increase, somewhat softening 
the decline in his marriageability. The more precipitous decline in the woman‘s sexual 
appeal, on the other hand, is worsened by another social convention: In general women 
marry men who are of the same age or older, but do not marry men significantly 
younger than themselves. The woman seeking a second husband thus operates in a 
constricted marriage market that largely excludes younger men. . . . The older woman 
may also be unable to offer child-bearing services. If she has children already by a 
previous marriage, they may well have a negative value for prospective mates. In other 
words, the divorced older woman finds the ―price‖ she can get for her domestic 
services relatively depressed in the marriage market segment in which she operates.  
 These gender differences in the impact of age on marriageability further increase the 
risk of traditional marriage for women. Ending the marriage becomes even less 
expensive for men, while a wife‘s probable loss increases as the parties age. Thus, the 
traditional wife not only makes substantial investments early in expectation of a 
deferred return, but she depletes her capital assets while making those investments. 
She gives him ―the best years of her life‖—the years in which her sexual appeal is 
highest, her fertility greatest, and her domestic services are most in demand—and she 
can never get those years back. At the same time, the man realizes gains from the 
marriage during its early years, in the form of increased earning capacity as well as the 
production of children, and his earning capacity has general value both in the marriage 
market and in the commercial world. He can take much of the gain realized from his 
first marriage into a second, and he can more easily find a replacement mate. 
Ellman, supra note 111, at 42–44 (footnotes omitted).  
 160. The sole exception arises in the situation of mass layoffs, where the Worker 
Adjustment Retraining Notification Act requires sixty days‘ notice. Worker Adjustment and 
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transitional support is not available from the employer as a matter of 
right, and state support through unemployment insurance is limited to 
workers with sufficient labor market force attachment and earnings 
history to qualify. This is true regardless of duration of the 
employment relationship, even though employment—like marriage—
features a temporal life cycle in which the dependent individual‘s 
bargaining power is highest at the outset of the relationship and in the 
early years, and then wanes as investments specific to the relationship 
are made, yielding a powerful lock-in effect for the more vulnerable 
party and a temptation for the stronger party to under-compensate or 
exit when the costs outweigh the benefits of continuing.
161
 
The continuing divergence in how law treats employment as 
opposed to marriage is justified by the myths of non-investment and 
non-intimacy, and the goal of free mobility in the labor market. The 
next part catalogues some of the ways in which workers invest and 
form intimate connections at work, and the remainder of this section 
considers legal reforms consistent with a goal of free mobility in the 
labor market that would nevertheless protect workers‘ investments. 
A. The Myth of Non-investment in Employment 
Workers invest in the firms that employ them, particularly over 
time. They wear out their bodies on the job. They invest emotionally 
and psychologically in the firm as well. For most, work is more than 
a matter of economic necessity. Indeed, for most, work is constitutive 
of identity.
162
 Working confers self-sufficiency, dignity, standing in 
society, and membership in the social structure. Not to work means 




 161. Workers are most vulnerable to discharge at the outset of the relationship, when they 
commit substantial resources to relocating, forgoing other opportunities, learning firm-specific 
skills, and yet are relatively fungible from the employer‘s perspective. Late-career workers are 
also vulnerable to opportunistic discharge because internal job ladders and seniority practices 
render them costly (paid disproportionately well relative to their productivity). Thus, courts are 
most likely to protect workers in these two groups using mechanisms such as implied contract 
theory. See Schwab, supra note 91, at 11, 41. Others have observed, however, that the mid-
career worker is equally vulnerable, since she has already made her investment but has most 
likely not yet reaped its full benefits. See Stone, supra note 124, at 537. 
 162. See PAUL DU GAY, CONSUMPTION AND IDENTITY AT WORK 9 (1996) (explaining that 
work is a stable source of identity and meaning in people‘s lives). 
 163. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 
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Workers also make firm-specific investments of human capital 
and advance along the internal job ladders inside their firms, 
simultaneously aging and pricing themselves out of the market as 
they allow other opportunities to pass.
164
 They build families, forge 
social networks, and invest in homes and in their communities, 
binding themselves to the geographic area where the employer‘s firm 
is located. They raise and socialize children who, in some parts of the 
country, go into the same plants, mills, and mines that their ancestors 
have labored in for decades before them. Workers also invest 
financially in the firms that employ them, particularly through 
purchases of company stock in their retirement plans, as the Enron 
and WorldCom debacles revealed in stark and painful terms.
165
  
Nor do firms remain neutral in this process. Employer human 
resource policies designed to reduce turnover costs and enhance 
productivity actively incentivize worker investment. Historically, 
firms used compensation in a variety of forms to align workers‘ 
financial interests with those of the firm, hoping to encourage 
attachment and loyalty. Profit-sharing plans, discounted employer 
stock purchase plans, and employee stock ownership plans all played 
a role in binding employees to the firm and eliciting extraordinary 
effort from them.
166
 In response to wage and price controls imposed 
during World War II that blocked firms from paying higher wages, 
employers substituted health insurance and pension benefits to attract 
scarce workers in the World War II labor market. Favorable tax 
treatment and aggressive bargaining by labor unions completed the 
picture, and health and pension benefits became part of the standard 
package of fringe benefits.
167
 In addition to allowing firms to recruit 
and retain a stable workforce, pension benefits also assisted in 
regulating workforce tenure: by facilitating retirement and linking 
 
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 530–34 (1997); see also Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1881, 1890–91 (2000). 
 164. See Schwab, supra note 91, at 41. 
 165. Crain, supra note 2, at 1234–36.  
 166. Id. at 1192; see also Dana M. Muir, The U.S. Culture of Employee Ownership and 
401(k) Plans, 14 ELDER L.J. 1, 5 (2006). 
 167. David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 
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In recent years, service sector employers have also developed 
increasingly sophisticated internal marketing programs designed to 
bind workers to the firm while simultaneously enhancing 
productivity. Internal marketing programs ―sell‖ the corporate brand 
to employees inside the firm. The goals of internal branding 
programs are to align employee identity with the firm‘s brand values 
and to nurture an emotional attachment to the firm that will pay off in 
enhanced employee loyalty and extra-role behavior, which in turn 
correlates with higher customer satisfaction and loyalty.
169
 Internal 
branding programs deploy a coordinated hiring, training, disciplinary, 
and reward structure to indoctrinate workers into brand values and 
create an emotional connection to the firm that will blur the 
boundaries between workers‘ self-interest and that of the firm.
170
 The 
most effective branding programs generate a sense of community and 
belonging that induces organizational citizenship behavior—
extraordinary effort in the service of the firm‘s goals—and reduces 
the need for close supervision. Workers essentially manage 




Such human resource strategies are designed to deconstruct the 
antagonistic relationship between the firm and its workers. The most 
effective programs deliberately solicit a deeper psychological 
investment in the firm, yielding not only psychological investment, 
but financial investment. A surprisingly high percentage of workers 
hold disproportionate shares of company stock in undiversified 
401(k) retirement accounts, despite media coverage attendant to the 
 
 168. Crain, supra note 2, at 1192–93; CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 7, at 918–19. 
 169. See Colin Mitchell, Selling the Brand Inside, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2002, at 99. 
 170. The typical internal branding program includes the following elements: 
communicating and explaining the brand to employees, convincing them of its value, linking 
every brand in the organization to delivery of the brand promise, establishing and enforcing 
performance standards designed to measure fulfillment of the brand promise, and selecting, 
training, rewarding and punishing employees according to their level of on-brand behavior. 
Pierre Berthon, Michael Ewing & Li Lian Hah, Captivating Company: Dimensions of 
Attractiveness in Employer Branding, 24 INT‘L J. ADVERTISING 151, 153–54 (2005). 
 171. See Libby Sartain, Branding From the Inside Out at Yahoo!: HR’s Role as Brand 
Builder, 44 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 89 (2005); Crain, supra note 2, at 1208–09. 
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implosion of firms like WorldCom and Enron that demonstrate the 
risks of an undiversified retirement portfolio when workers lose their 
jobs and life savings simultaneously.
172
 In earlier work, I have argued 
that internal branding programs distort employees‘ perception of their 
own self-interest, persuading workers to internalize and adopt the 
firm‘s values and brand as their own.
173
 For those who internalize the 
employer‘s brand, the rewards are unparalleled feelings of connection 
and belonging. As economist George Akerlof explained, workers 
―anthropomorphize‖ the firms for which they work, developing 




B. The Myth of Non-Intimacy in Employment 
Of course, emotional investment in employment does not 
necessarily equate to intimacy as the concept is understood in family 
law—e.g., relationships that involve love. But the traditional concept 
of intimacy does not capture all nonmarket ties; intimate ties can and 
do exist outside the realm of romantic or familial love.
175
 A broader 
understanding of intimacy might consider attachment, affection, 
loyalty and feelings of duty or obligation. Consider, for example, 
worker solidarity. While solidarity does not mean that workers love 
or even like their coworkers, it does represent a form of social capital 
that signifies connection: ―some measure or mix of love, empathy . . . 
or commitment to principle‖ that gives rise to supportive networks 
between workers.
176
 An injury to one is seen as an injury to all; 
workers ―feel together,‖ experiencing events in the workplace 
 
 172. See James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Are Empowerment and 
Education Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, 2005 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY 151 (arguing that media coverage of the losses suffered by workers at Enron, 
WorldCom and Global Crossing as a result of under-diversification of retirement portfolios had 
only a minimal impact on investment patterns by employees in other companies; the authors 
found a 2 percent decline in employee investment in company stock following the media blitz). 
 173. Crain, supra note 2. 
 174. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q. J. ECON. 
543, 550 (1982). 
 175. See, e.g., Rosenbury, supra note 78.  
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It is equally apparent that nonmarket motives exist on the 
employer‘s side of the equation as well. Employers (or their 
individual managerial representatives) do not always behave as 
classic market actors. Business owners sometimes manifest affection 
and sympathy for workers.
178
 Individual supervisors sometimes make 
common cause with workers.
179
 And employment discrimination law 
is rife with examples of individual supervisors who displayed 




C. Transition and the Importance of Notice 
If we acknowledge the presence of investment and intimacy in 
employment that parallel investment and intimacy in marriage, what 
form might a legal regime applicable to both and designed to mitigate 
the effects of sudden termination take? In the past, employment law 
scholars have focused on constraining exit by modifying the at-will 
rule. Most ignore the goal of free labor mobility, arguing that the 
costs of the at-will doctrine fall too heavily on wrongly or arbitrarily 
discharged employees, and propose a just cause standard either as a 
default rule around which the parties may contract or as an absolute 
constraint.
181
 Like the argument for re-invigoration of fault principles 
 
 177. See Crain, supra note 1, at 1868.  
 178. See, e.g., Rebecca Leung, The Mensch of Malden Mills, 60 MINUTES (July 6, 2003), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/03/60minutes/main561656.shtml (describing efforts 
of mill owner to support employees of his family‘s textile mill in the aftermath of a fire that 
destroyed the business).  
 179. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 702 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983) (supervisor fired 
for refusing to spy on employees).  
 180. See, e.g., Holloman v. Keadle, 931 S.W. 2d 413 (1996) (tort claim for outrage against 
physician-employer who frequently cursed employer, referred to her as a ―white nigger,‖ ―slut,‖ 
and ―whore,‖ and threatened to kill her if she quit or ―caused trouble‖).  
 181. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress, A Synthesis and a Proposal for Reform of the 
Employment At-Will Doctrine, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 319, 346 (1988); Stephen F. Befort, Labor 
and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. 
L. REV. 351, 424 (2002); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On 
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Estlund, 
supra note 136; Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” 
Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1746–50 (2004); St. Antoine, supra note 10, at 71–81; Clyde 
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at divorce, this position ignores the dramatic shift in cultural norms 
toward the embrace of free mobility and the concomitant opportunity 
to make a better match, whether it be a job or a spouse. For that 
reason, such proposals are doomed.  
A few recent analyses, however, have accepted values of free 
mobility as the new normal and instead proposed reforms designed to 
ease the transition from one job to another and simultaneously protect 
workers.
182
 Rachel Arnow-Richman has made a particularly strong 
case for accepting the norm of free mobility in labor markets and 
focusing legal reform on easing the transition to the next job rather 
than erecting barriers to termination.
183
 She proposes a default rule 
mandating advance notice of termination (or, at the employer‘s 
election, severance pay for the duration of the notice period). Her 
proposal would apply to every employment relationship, thus 
extending to all workers the protections afforded by the federal 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN)
184
 to 
workers terminated as part of a mass layoff (albeit with employers 
retaining the option to provide severance pay in lieu of notice).
185
 An 
exception would exist where the employer could establish just cause 
for discharge (―serious misconduct‖ in Arnow-Richman‘s 
terminology).
186
 Arnow-Richman‘s approach would leave intact the 
 
W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. 
REV. 481, 521 (1976); Sunstein, supra note 136. 
 182. See, e.g., Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for 
Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 135–37 (2006) (arguing 
that creation of property right in employment is ―overkill‖ and proposing a requirement of 
notice, analogizing sale of labor to a lease of human capital); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge 
at Work Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. 
L. REV. 721 (2002) (describing contemporary employment contract as a promise of training and 
skill development that will enhance marketability in exchange for zealous commitment to work 
in the immediate term and extra-role performance, and arguing that courts should refuse to 
enforce covenants not to compete where the employer does not honor its end of the bargain).  
 183. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 36 (2010) (―If employers no longer implicitly offer workers long-term job 
security, and employees no longer expect to remain in the same job for their lifetime, the 
guiding theory of worker protection should focus on enabling continued labor market 
participation rather than on preserving particular jobs.‖). 
 184. See Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–
2109 (2006). 
 185. Arnow-Richman, supra note 183, at 8. Arnow-Richman dubs this a ―pay-or-play‖ 
system. Id.  
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statutory and common law exceptions to employment at will, 
permitting workers who could show illegal motivation to continue to 
challenge the termination itself. For most workers, however, notice 
would become the ―new cause,‖ offering protection to workers 
terminated for any reason other than just cause.
187
 Arnow-Richman‘s 
approach thus re-focuses the law on how termination occurs rather 
than on why it occurs.
188
 
The parallel between Arnow-Richman‘s proposal and the course 
that family law has followed is striking. Once we relinquish the idea 
that law should impose barriers to the termination of intimate 
relationships that are core to individuals‘ well-being, the benefits of 
easing the deleterious effects of termination through transition 
strategies are revealed. At family law, notice, waiting periods, 
temporary support, and rehabilitative alimony are standard tools for 
facilitating the transition from dependence (both emotional and 
financial) to independence (or to a new intimate relationship; 
alimony/spousal support, for example, terminates upon cohabitation 
in many states and remarriage in nearly all). Retaining a fault-based 
exception allowing for speedier termination and reducing the costs of 
termination for the innocent party is another striking parallel between 
Arnow-Richman‘s proposal and the family law.  
D. Recognizing Investment at Work 
In a landmark 1988 law review article, Joseph Singer argued that 
our social vision of how individuals interact with one another and 
with the community shapes our perceptions, language, morality, and 
normative commitments.
189
 In the family law arena, the law creates 
property rights arising out of intimate relationships of mutual 
dependence and enforces them through divorce and property 
distribution proceedings in family court or civil court, taking into 
account the status of the more vulnerable spouse or partner, the non-
economic contributions of the non-title-holding spouse or partner, 
 
 187. See id. at 38. 
 188. Id. at 39–41. 
 189. Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 627 
(1988). 
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and the reliance interests of the parties.
190
 Thus, Singer points out, our 
legal system already recognizes expectation and reliance interests by 
creating affirmative obligations that grow out of relationships over 
time, even where the parties have made no formal agreement to share 
property.
191
 Why shouldn‘t we extend this recognition to the interests 
that grow out of the employment relationship over time? Why 
shouldn‘t property law protect the more vulnerable party (the worker) 




Pragmatic objections to this approach are relatively easily 
overcome. Family law typically links both property entitlement at 
dissolution of the marriage and alimony to marital longevity, 
recognizing the likelihood that contribution, need and reliance 
increase as marriage endures and the parties age. Would doing the 
same at termination of employment using a figure based upon wages 
and longevity of employment be so unthinkable? In tacit recognition 
of the investment and dependence that workers forge to firms, 
voluntary severance pay in the employment context has traditionally 
also been tied to job longevity. A 2009 survey found that 46.2 percent 
of employers offered severance pay to all employees and 30.1 percent 
offer it to a subset of departing employees.
193
 Sixty-three percent of 
firms link the amount of severance pay to length of service, though 
some also link it to employee status and others use a unitary 
severance figure or link it to the reason for the separation (severance 
is more likely to be available if the position was eliminated, and less 
likely to be available if the worker was discharged for poor 
performance).
194
 A typical formulation of severance pay by longevity 
is one to two weeks‘ pay per year of service, up to a maximum of 
twelve weeks‘ pay.
195
 Though U.S. law does not mandate severance 
 
 190. Id. at 692–94. 
 191. Id. at 701. 
 192. Id. at 724. 
 193. How Employers Are Handling Severance, HR FOCUS (Inst. of Mgmt. & Admin., 
Newark, N.J.), Nov. 2009, at 10–11. Large firms are particularly likely to furnish severance 
pay, usually as a mechanism for inducing ―voluntary‖ departures so that firms do not have to 
choose which workers to cut, or in exchange for a waiver of legal claims by involuntarily 
departing workers. Id. at 11. 
 194. Id. at 13.  
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pay, human resources policy in many firms supports it, either for its 
litigation-avoidance benefits, the positive morale boost it affords to 
those workers who remain, or because it serves as a vehicle for 
preserving a relationship between the departing worker and the 
firm.
196
 Such a relationship affords the firm the opportunity to re-hire 
departing workers for subsequent projects, re-deploy them in new 
organizational roles, and protect valuable intellectual capital.
197
  
Pressing the family law analogy a bit further, title to property no 
longer reigns supreme in dividing property at marital dissolution. 
Assets acquired during marriage through the labor of either or both 
are divisible property, regardless of how title is held. Why should 
title continue to control the disposition of property created through 
the joint labor of workers and the firm during an employment 
relationship? In some industries, for example, trade secrets might be 
viewed as an asset created by the workers as a collective rather than 
as property belonging solely to the firm. Professor Nathan Newman 
has argued that because trade secrets are the product of collaboration 




Alternatively, in situations where workers‘ accumulated human 
capital is so intertwined with firm-specific relationships that exit is 
hindered by contracts limiting re-employability (a covenant not to 
compete) or by trade secrets doctrine (particularly the inevitable 
disclosure rule), law might impose financial costs upon the party 
seeking to enforce the limits on mobility. Katherine Stone has argued 
that courts should limit the enforceability of noncompetes where the 
employer has not made a significant contribution to the worker‘s 
 
suggest that voluntary severance plans calculate non-executive employee severance benefits at 
one week per year of service). 
 196. Ninety-six percent of workers receiving severance are required to sign a waiver of 
rights to sue as a condition of receipt. See How Employers Are Handling Severance, supra note 
193, at 11, 13. 
 197. RIGHT MGMT., SEVERANCE PRACTICES AROUND THE WORLD: EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW 
4 (2009).  
 198. Nathan A. Newman, Trade Secrets and Collective Bargaining: A Solution to 
Resolving Tensions in the Economics of Innovation, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 1, 28–29 
(2002) (proposing that trade secrets should be regulated and valued through collective 
bargaining so that workers receive fair compensation for their part in producing them). 
















 Still another option would be to apply 
the pay-or-play principle: employers who bind their workers to non-
compete agreements could be required either to pay a predetermined 
lump sum to the worker in recognition of the temporary barrier to re-
employability that is posed by the non-compete (calibrated by 
duration of the non-compete), or to waive the noncompete and forego 
payment.  
Of course, there is a flip side to the coin of employment as 
relationship: workers might owe reciprocal obligations to employers, 
too.
200
 More robust duties of loyalty, deference to managerial 
authority, and obligations to give notice before quitting come to 
mind. Although this risk is not insubstantial, many of these duties are 
already remarkably entrenched in labor and employment law 
doctrine, a fact that is sometimes hard to square with the lip service 
paid to the arm‘s-length character of the relationship. For example, 
courts routinely dismiss claims by employees who have displayed 




E. Seeing the Damage of Job Loss 
The law‘s frame of employment as an impersonal spot transaction 
of work for wages rather than as an ongoing relationship also directs 
the limited damages available under most employment statutes. 
Relief in employment law contexts is generally limited to economic 
losses; equitable remedies are the staple of most employment statutes, 
and compensatory and punitive damages are either unavailable (e.g., 
NLRA, FLSA) or extremely limited (e.g., Title VII damages caps 
linked to size of employer).
202
 Scott Moss and Peter Huang have 
 
 199. Stone, supra note 182. 
 200. Scott Baker alludes to this possibility in his Comment. See Baker, supra note 12, at 
214 (speculating that perhaps employees who quit should be required to reimburse the employer 
for sunk costs).  
 201. See Matheny & Crain, supra note 181, at 1726–36 (discussing illustrations of disloyal 
or insubordinate conduct found unprotected by the NLRA and disloyal or insubordinate speech 
by public sector employees held unprotected by the First Amendment); ATLESON, supra note 
80, at 91, 180 (exploring assumptions about employee status that influence judicial 
decisionmaking in labor disputes). 
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made a powerful case that employment law fails to take into account 
the emotional investment that employees make at work, and thus 
undercompensates their losses at termination.
203
 Moss and Huang 
argue that the vision of the rational actor that shapes old-school law 
and economics theory offers an impoverished view of the real-world 
dynamics of the labor market. Relying on evidence from behavioral 
economics and cognitive science, Moss and Huang propose that 
courts consider awarding compensatory damages for emotional 
distress when workers are wrongfully terminated, at least where the 
individual is unemployed for a significant period of time or is 




Moss and Huang‘s argument is entirely consistent with a holistic 
conception of workers‘ motivations as driven by a complex interplay 
of love and money, and offers further evidence of how different work 
law might look if it rejected the intimacy/for-profit dichotomy. Of 
course, it is also possible that a frame of employment as relationship 
might render courts reluctant to require that such relationships be 
initiated or maintained (for example, through imposition of 
instatement or reinstatement remedies). After all, if workers are 
fungible tools of production akin to machines, reinstatement and 
instatement remedies are tolerable as long as productivity is 
maintained. But if the affective or intimate aspects of employment 
are emphasized, might courts become as reluctant to order the 
maintenance of employment relationships as they are in the context 
of marital or familial relationships? 
These are risks worth taking, in my view. In the end, how law 
conceptualizes employment and addresses the consequences of 
financial instability or termination reflects the values that society 
chooses to privilege. As Clyde Summers once observed:  
Instability of employment, often in the form of mass 
dislocation, is a painful fact of our modern market economy 
. . . . The costs [of dislocation] must be borne either by the 
 
Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 195–206 (2009). 
 203. Id. at 220–21. 
 204. Id. at 258–59. 
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workers, the employer or by society in general. How we 
distribute those costs implicitly expresses our social values 
. . . .
205
 
This Essay is an unapologetic argument for recognizing the 
investments that workers make and the attachments that they form at 




Law is obsessed with categories. Indeed, some might say that law 
is all about drawing distinctions between one type of thing, 
relationship, or transaction and another in order to justify the 
differential legal treatment accorded to items in one category versus 
those in another. In life, however, things, relationships, and 
transactions do not divide so neatly. Often, how they divide—and 
thus, how we treat them—turns almost entirely upon how we 
conceptualize them to begin with.
207
 Life‘s complexities and 
connections, rather than law‘s rigid categories, offer the promise of a 
more just legal regime. 
What difference might it make to think about employment as an 
intimate relationship characterized by investment rather than limiting 
our conceptual frame to an arm‘s-length exchange of labor for 
dollars? The differences might be as simple as requiring notice and 
transitional assistance (severance pay) linked to longevity and/or 
investment, as radical as recognizing new common law claims based 
in property rights for workers (such as collective rights to trade 
secrets), or as straightforward as heeding evidence of emotional harm 
linked to termination and providing compensation for it. This Essay 
has argued that reconceptualizing employment as a relationship—as 
 
 205. Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A Comparative 
Study of Social Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1995).  
 206. For additional argument along these lines, see Marion Crain, Work Matters, 19 KAN. 
J.L. & POL‘Y 365 (2010).  
 207. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2005) 
(describing sale of rabbits for ―pets or meat, you decide. If a customer wants rabbits as meat, 
[the female entrepreneur] will provide them slaughtered and dressed, or her customer can take 
them home and butcher them; on the other hand, a customer who wants rabbits as pets, can buy 
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